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This paper introduces a new detailed data set of high-frequency observations on inventory
investment by a U.S. steel wholesaler. Our analysis of these data leads to six main con-
clusions: orders and sales are made infrequently; orders are more volatile than sales; order
sizes vary considerably; there is substantial high-frequency variation in the rm's sales prices;
inventory/sales ratios are unstable; and there are occasional stockouts. We model the rm
generically as a durable commodity intermediary that engages in commodity price speculation.
We demonstrate that the rm's inventory investment behavior at the product level is well
approximated by an optimal trading strategy from the solution to a nonlinear dynamic pro-
gramming problem with two continuous state variables and one continuous control variable
that is subject to frequently binding inequality constraints. We show that the optimal trading
strategy is a generalized (S; s) rule. That is, whenever the rm's inventory level q falls below
the order threshold s(p) the rm places an order of size S(p)   q in order to attain a target
inventory level S(p) satisfying S(p)  s(p), where p is the current spot price at which the
rm can purchase unlimited amounts of the commodity after incurring a xed order cost K.
We show that the (S; s) bands are decreasing functions of p, capturing the basic intuition of
commodity price speculation, namely, that it is optimal for the rm to hold higher inventories
when the spot price is low than when it is high in order to prot from \buying low and selling
high." We simulate a calibrated version of this model and show that the simulated data exhibit
the key features of inventory investment we observe in the data.
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1 Introduction
This paper formulates and solves a dynamic model of optimal inventory investment by durable
commodity intermediaries. Commodity intermediaries are companies whose business is to stock-
pile quantities of homogeneous durable goods such as steel, lumber, coal, etc. These rms do
minimal production processing, and make prots via inter-temporal speculation, purchasing bulk
quantities of durable commodities at competitive world spot market prices and subsequently sell-
ing their inventories to customers at a mark-up.
We study a new database from one such intermediary, a U.S. steel wholesaler or, in industry
lingo, a steel service center. This rm has oered us a unique opportunity to undertake detailed
observations of its operations on an ongoing basis by providing us with daily data on purchases
and sales of each of the 2,200+ separate products that it sells. We know the rm's initial inventory
holdings starting in July 1, 1997, allowing us to calculate inventory holdings for each product on
a daily basis for 20 consecutive months. We also have highly condential data on the identities
of each of the rm's customers, the prices they were charged, and the quantities they purchased.
Our analysis of these data yields six main conclusions:
1. Orders and sales are made infrequently.
2. Orders are more volatile than sales.
3. There is considerable variability in order levels.
4. There is no stable inventory/sales relationship.
5. Inventory stockouts and near stockouts occur regularly, especially during regimes of low
inventory holdings.
6. There is considerable high-frequency variation in sales prices.
We observe all six facts at the individual product level. We observe facts 2, 3, and 6 at the rm
level. To explain these facts we solve a dynamic programming model which treats each product
as an independent \prot center". Using this model we ask whether the rm's behavior can be
accurately approximated by the optimal trading strategy implied by the model's solution.
In the model, the spot price fptg of the commodity is assumed to evolve according to an
exogenously specied rst-order Markov process. At the start of each period the rm decides how
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much new inventory qot to order at the spot price pt. There is a xed transaction cost K for placing
any order, so the rm will only place suÆciently large orders for which the incremental change in
expected prots exceeds K. In all other respects we model the rm as behaving passively. That
is, we assume that the rm does not attempt to bargain with customers or price discriminate.
Instead the rm quotes an exogenously specied markup over the current spot price pt, and
receives a random realized demand qdt which is lled on a \rst come, rst served" basis subject
to the constraint that quantity sold cannot exceed stock on hand qt + q
o
t .
The rm's optimal speculative investment strategy is the solution to an innite horizon dy-
namic programming problem. This problem is isomorphic to the problem of optimal inventory
management that has been extensively studied in the Operations Research literature. Although a
number of existing models in this literature allow the costs of \producing" new inventory to evolve
stochastically, we are not aware of a previous study that is directly relevant to the problem faced
by speculative investor or a durable commodity intermediary who has the ability to purchase
(versus produce) new inventory at a constant marginal cost pt which changes stochastically from
period to period according to a Markov transition density g(pt+1jpt).
The fact that our model involves a non-convex xed transaction cost (adjustment cost) K
suggests that the most directly relevant predecessor to our work is the theory of optimal inventory
investment developed by Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) and Scarf (1960). Extending a classic
result by Scarf (1960) characterizing the optimal inventory investment strategy as an (S; s) rule,
Hall and Rust (1999) proved that the optimal inventory investment strategy continues to take
the (S; s) form when the spot price pt represents the marginal cost of production that evolves
stochastically. In this case the optimal solution takes the form of a generalized (S; s) rule in which
S and s are functions of p. The function s(p) is the order threshold and the function S(p) is the
target inventory level satisfying S(p)  s(p). Under an (S; s) rule, the optimal order size is zero
whenever the current inventory level q exceeds s(p). However when q falls below s(p) the rm
places an order of size S(p) q, restoring inventory levels to the target level S(p). The magnitude
of the gap between s and S depends on the magnitude of xed costs of ordering new inventories:
if K = 0 then s(p) = S(p), otherwise s(p) < S(p).
In our example both s(p) and S(p) are decreasing functions of p, capturing the basic intuition
of commodity price speculation, namely, that it is optimal for the rm to hold higher inventories
when the spot price is low than when it is high. In eect it is a prescription for how best to
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prot from \buying low and selling high." Under the optimal policy the rm exploits low spot
order price opportunities by making large purchases. The rm can make capital gains on its
inventory holdings once the price rises. However the rm faces a risk that if prices remain low for
a protracted period, some or all of its expected speculative prots will be dissipated by the interest
opportunity costs and physical costs of storing the commodity. Interest opportunity costs are an
increasing function of the spot price of steel. Further, demand tends to be lower when prices are
high. This implies that both S(p) and s(p) are small when p is high, reecting the rm's desire
to maintain a relatively low level of inventories when demand is low and holding costs are high.
As a result when p is high, q is relatively small and stockouts occasionally occur. Via a numerical
simulation, we show that our simple model of optimal commodity price speculation implies the
key stylized facts of inventory investment that we observe in the steel data. In particular, we
nd that in our simulated data set orders are infrequent, order quantities are more variable than
sales, inventory/sales ratios vary dramatically, stock-outs occur when spot prices are high, and
inventory holdings follow \saw-tooth" trajectories similar to those we observe for individual steel
products.
While the main focus of this paper is to explain the high-frequency behavior of a single rm,
the issues addressed may be of interest to economists studying movements of aggregates at lower,
particularly business cycle, frequencies. In general, recessions can be characterized as periods
of inventory liquidations. While in the U.S. inventory investment averages less than one-half of
one percent of GDP, during a typical recession the reduction in inventory investment accounts
arithmetically for about 50 percent of the reduction in GDP (Ramey and West, 1997). So if we
want to understand business cycles, it is important to understand inventory investment behavior,
and as we show below, commodity intermediaries account for a large share of aggregate inventory
investment.
In the U.S., commodity intermediaries are classied in the merchant wholesale trade sector of
the economy (SIC Major Groups 50 and 51). As a group, the wholesale trade sector comprises
between 6.5 and 7.0 percent of GDP, and this sector holds about 26% of the total outstanding
stock of inventories.1 The wholesale trade sector is decomposed into a durable goods sector (SIC
Major Group 50) and a nondurable goods sector (SIC Major Group 51). About 2/3 of the stock
of wholesale trade inventories are held by establishments within the durable goods sector, with
1The remaining stock of inventories is held by either manufacturers or retailers.
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the remaining 1/3 held by establishments in the nondurable goods sector.
Steel service centers are classied within the durable goods sector of wholesale trade.2 There
are 5,000 such rms located throughout the U.S. with a high concentration in the Great Lakes
region. These rms currently hold between 7 and 8 million tons of steel in inventory. Out of the
127 million tons of steel consumed in the U.S. in 1998, about 29 million tons (23 percent) was
shipped through steel service centers. This makes steel service centers the largest single customer
group of the ultimate suppliers, the steel mills.
Section 2 provides a brief review of the existing literature on inventory investment. Section 3
presents the steel inventory data and summarizes the six main conclusions from our empirical
analysis that we will attempt to explain with a simple dynamic programming model of inventory
investment. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 displays numerically computed solutions and
stochastic simulations of a calibrated example of the model. Section 6 compares our rm level
data to more aggregated data. Section 7 summarizes our ndings.
2 Background
There is an extensive literature on the role of commodity storage from an aggregate perspective
(see, e.g. Working, 1949 and Williams and Wright, 1991); however we are unaware of more
detailed micro-oriented studies of individual agents participating in these markets. Although the
main ideas behind the role of commodity storage have been around for many years, only relatively
recently have economists attempted to deduce the implications of this model for commodity prices.
A stylized version of the dynamic rational expectations commodity storage model, (e.g. Deaton
and Laroque, 1992 or Miranda and Rui, 1997) posits that the aggregate supply of a commodity is
produced inelastically, with the supply evolving according to some stochastic process fztg. There
is a stationary demand function D(p), so in the absence of storage, equilibrium prices evolve
according to the stochastic process fD 1(zt)g. However if we assume a storage technology exists
with a \convenience yield" ct = c(xt) (equal to the immediate benet from having one additional
unit of the commodity in storage net of the costs of storing it, where xt is a vector of state variables
aecting the costs and benets of storage), then competition by commodity intermediaries and
2The four-digit SIC code for steel service centers is 5051; their NAICS code is 42151.
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speculators should cause prices to satisfy the equation
pt = max
h
D 1(zt); c(xt) + Efpt+1jpt; xt; ztg
i
; (1)
where  = 1=(1 + r). This functional equation (1) denes pt = p(xt; zt) as the unique xed
point to a contraction mapping. Deaton and Laroque, Miranda and Rui and others have solved
this functional equation numerically and have analyzed the implications of storage for the time
series behavior of commodity prices. This work has shown that many of the observed properties
of commodity prices, including skewness, occasional price spikes (i.e. sharp price increases as
opposed to price decreases), and high autocorrelations can be explained as a result of compet-
itive storage even if the fundamental \forcing process" fztg is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed IID. To our knowledge there is no \microfoundations" derivation for the
intertemporal equilibrium relationship (1). However the argument is that if prices did not satisfy
this relationship, speculators would buy or sell the commodity to equate current and expected
future prices net of storage/carrying costs. We attempt to cast some insight into this using out
micro model of commodity intermediaries. According to the functional equation, price spikes
occur during aggregate stockouts; otherwise speculators succeed in stabilizing prices, preventing
sharp increases or decreases in commodity prices during times of production surpluses or short-
ages. The theory suggests that sudden crashes in commodity prices should not occur, since this
would induce speculators to purchase and store the commodity for subsequent resale.
The steel service center we study is precisely one of the \speculators" implicit in the commodity
storage model. However the recent collapse in commodity prices in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian
nancial crisis calls into question the power of inventory speculation in preventing the steep price
declines that occurred during 1998. The physical costs of storing commodities such as steel are
presumably very small and the rate of depreciation of steel is close to zero. However the interest
opportunity costs of storing these commodities can be substantial, a fact that seems to have been
overlooked in the commodity storage literature. It is reasonable to suppose that speculators will
not buy large quantities of a commodity in the aftermath of a price crash if they expect it to
be followed by a sustained recession that would limit their ability to resell the commodity at
attractive prices in the future. This observation underscores the importance of extending the
commodity storage model by building more detailed models of the speculators underlying these
models, including the commodity intermediaries we study here.
6
There is also an extensive literature of macro-level models of inventories which assume short-
run increasing marginal costs to holding inventories. The workhorse model of this literature is
the linear quadratic (LQ) model introduced by Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon (1960). The
standard LQ model implies that production (orders) should be smoother than sales. Since this
implication is almost always rejected empirically, a variety modications have been made. For ex-
ample many authors augment these models with an \accelerator term" in the prot function which
is essentially a quadratic penalty function from deviating from a xed \target" inventory/sales
ratio. This target is treated as an unknown parameter to be estimated (e.g. Blanchard, 1983;
West, 1986; and Kashyap and Wilcox, 1993). Kahn (1987, 1992) justies an inventory/sales ratio
target by explicitly incorporating costly stock-outs. Bils and Kahn (1996) further justify targeting
such a ratio by modeling sales as an increasing function of the available inventories. A second
modication is to assume that rms operate on at or even decreasing regions of their short-run
marginal cost curves. Ramey (1991), Bresnahan and Ramey (1994), and Hall (1997) provide
evidence that rms may often operate in such regions. Third, Blinder (1986b) and Miron and
Zeldes (1988) and others have added cost shocks in the form of input price shocks, while others
such as Eichenbaum (1984, 1989) have added cost shocks in the form of unobservable technology
shocks. In these cost-shock models inventories are used to smooth production costs rather than
the level of production. These modications have improved the ability of the LQ model to explain
aggregate inventory time series, although as we will show in the next section it has some severe
handicaps in its ability to explain our product-level data.
Dynamic micro-level models of inventory investment incorporating a xed cost to ordering
were pioneered by Arrow, Harris, and Marschak (1951) and Scarf (1959). Scarf was the rst to
prove that the optimal policy is of the (S; s) form. In the simplest case, the rm chooses an order
limit point s, and an upper inventory point S. The rm place no orders until inventories fall to
s or below, whereupon the rm places an order to reset the inventory level to S. Blinder (1981),
Caplin (1985), and Fisher and Hornstein (1998) argue that explicitly modeling xed costs at the
rm level helps explain inventory behavior at the aggregate level.
Despite extensive research in the area of inventory investment, a satisfactory model to explain
this important time series has not yet been written down and solved. Even models which appear
capable of explaining the basic features of the data have clear aws. For example attempts to
estimate macro models of inventory investment often yield parameter estimates of the wrong sign.
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Some of the problems may stem from a lack of high-quality data on production and inventories.
Fair (1989) suggests that the observation that production is more volatile than sales is just a
gment of poorly constructed data. Miron and Zeldes (1989) demonstrate that there is substantial
measurement error in both the monthly manufacturing and inventory investment data. The
absence of high quality inventory data at the macro-level motivates us to study this issue at
the rm level. In their survey of the inventory literature for the Handbook of Macroeconomics
Ramey and West (1997) \advocate more plant and rm-level studies, although gathering such
data requires substantial work." (p. 47).
3 Data
A U.S. steel service center (referred to below as the \rm") provided us detailed data on every
transaction it undertook between July 1, 1997 to February 26, 1999 (434 business days) for each of
the 2200+ individual products that it sells. For each transaction we observe the quantity (number
of units and/or weight in pounds) of steel bought or sold, the sales price, the shipping costs, and
the identity of the buyer or seller. The rm's records provide data on the level of inventories for
each product at the beginning and end of each month. Using the inventory accumulation identity
we can track the rm's inventory holdings for each day within the month. Also since we observe
the prices at which this rm buys and sells steel, we also have a near-perfect measure of the
mark-ups charged to customers. Finally since we meet regularly with company executives, we are
able to eliminate any discrepancies in the transaction and inventory data. This is an exceptionally
clean dataset.
The rm records transactions on the day the steel either enters or leaves one of its warehouses.
Although the rm does receive some commitments for sales in advance, most of their sales are
delivered within 24 hours of the commitment, and 95 percent of their orders are lled within ve
days. Indeed, the primary service this wholesaler provides is having the goods on hand and being
able to deliver them to the customer on short notice. While back-orders do occasionally occur,
we study products which customers can assume the rm will have on hand. We do not have data
on when the rm makes an order to purchase steel. From discussion with company executives
we know that some of their orders are made weeks in advance (up to 12 weeks when purchasing
foreign steel), while some purchases are made with only a day or two notice. In this paper we
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assume the relevant time period is one business day.
Although this company oers over 2200 products, tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for
prices and quantities for eighteen of their most important products which are considered baseline
products within the industry. These products serve as key indicators from which the prices of
other products are calculated, and display the characteristic features that we see for many other
products. For reasons that will become clear subsequently, these products are also of interest
because none involve any actual production processing beyond storage and resale. Finally, we
chose relatively high volume products for which the rm made at least four orders during the
sample period. Figure 1 plots an indicator of the rm's aggregate inventory holdings, the sum (in
pounds) of the inventories for each of these eighteen products. Figure 2 plots the inventory/sales
ratio measured as \days supply" which we dene as the level of current inventories divided by
the average daily sales rate for the previous 30 business days.3 Figures 5 - 16 plot daily time
series for inventories, days-supply, and spot order and sales prices, for products 2, 4 and 13 in
tables 1 and 2. These gures also contain three dimensional scatterplots of purchase quantities
as a function of current inventory and order prices.
Our analysis of these data can be summarized in six main conclusions:
1. Orders and sales are made infrequently. In the second column of table 1, we report the
number of days in which each product enters one of the rm's warehouses. We have selected
some of the highest volume products this rm deals in; nevertheless, orders are rarely made.
Sales are made more frequently as can be seen from column (5) of table 1 and from the
absence of long at segments in the inventory graphs. However even for product 2, the
product with the most frequent sales, sales are made less than 3/4 of the days in the
sample. Note also that the periodicity between successive orders is highly variable.
2. Orders are more volatile than sales. The last column in the bottom row of table 2 reports the
ratio of the standard deviation of aggregate orders to the standard deviation of aggregate
sales. This ratio is 9.2, which shows that for this rm orders are substantially more volatile
than sales. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of table 2 report the unconditional means and
standard deviation of orders and sales. But since sales and orders and made infrequently, we
3Computing days-supply using future sales instead of past sales does not change the qualitative features of any
of the graphs in this paper.
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also report in columns (3), (5), (7), and (9) the means and standard deviation conditional
on an order or sale occurring. Not surprisingly, since orders are made less frequently than
sales, the average order size is larger than the average sales size. As is found in many other
studies, the standard deviation of orders is larger than the standard deviation of sales. This
holds for all eighteen products; see column (10). Note that extremely large sales are rare
events as can be seen from the relatively small number of large discontinuous downward
jumps in inventory levels in the time series plots.
3. There is considerable variability in order levels. In table 2, we can see that for all but four
of the eighteen products, conditional on an order occurring, the standard deviation of order
size (column (5)) is larger than mean order size (column (3)). This fact can also be seen
graphically in our plots of the data for products 2, 4, and 13 in gures 5 - 16. Figures 5, 9,
and 13 display the time path of the inventory holdings for these three products. These
gures display a \saw-tooth" pattern for inventory holdings with intervals during which
inventory levels steadily decrease due to sales to customers punctuated by periodic large
orders that replenish inventory holdings. Thus, inventory holdings can be characterized as a
jump process with a negative drift due to numerous small sales, and periodic discontinuous
upward jumps due to a relatively small number of large orders.
However the rm also makes many small orders. This is apparent in gures 6, 10, and 14,
which display scatterplots of order size as a function of current inventory holding and the
order price. In general, these three graphs illustrate that the lower the price and the lower
the level of inventories, the larger the order. But a striking feature of these gures is the
number of small orders { especially when inventories and the order price are high. Also
note that in gure 6 most of the orders for product 2 lie in a band between 19.00 and 19.50.
The tendency for order size to increase rapidly as a function of order price suggests that
the rm's demand for product 2 is highly elastic. This suggests that inventory holdings are
quite sensitive to the spot price of steel, a conclusion that is conrmed from an inspection
of the time series for inventories and order prices in gures 5 and 7, 9 and 11, and 13 and
15, respectively. Comparing these graphs vertically, we see that the biggest upward jumps
in inventories generally occur when the (interpolated) order price series hits historical lows.
However our ability to make clear inferences about this is hampered by the fact that we only
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observe spot prices for these products on the days the rm places orders for steel. Thus we
cannot be sure that the actual spot price series may actually have been even lower between
the successive dates at which large purchases occurred. However we have indirect evidence
of the importance of price shocks from aggregate price indices such as the example displayed
in gure 3. At least for the last three quarters of 1998, the steady decrease in steel prices are
matched by steady increases in inventory levels as we can see from gure 4 which plots the
inventory/sales ratios for several independent measures of carbon plate (i.e our rm level
data and aggregate industry holdings of carbon plate).
4. There is no stable inventory/sales relationship. Figures 8, 12, and 16 display the inven-
tory/sales ratio in terms of days-supply. As in the case of the aggregate days-supply series,
these three inventory/sales ratios uctuate widely and in the case of products 4 and 13
appear to have multiple "regimes" with high and low inventory/sales ratios.
This nding is not inconsistent with the well-documented fact in the inventory literature
that there is considerable persistence in the deviations in the inventory-sales relationship
from its long-run mean (e.g. Feldstein and Auerbach, 1976; Blinder, 1986a; and Ramey
and West, 1997). The mean of the days-supply series of the rm's aggregate inventory
holdings plotted in gure 2 is 66 days. So for the rst 240 business days of the sample
the rm below its long-run mean, and for the second 200 business days the rm is above
its long-run mean. This could be interpreted as considerable persistence in the inventory-
sales relationship; however for reasons we discuss below it does not appear that the rm is
targeting a constant inventory-to-sales ratio and just slowly adjusting toward it.
5. Inventory stockouts and near stockouts occur regularly, especially during regimes of low
inventory holdings. From gures 8, 12, and 16, we can see that the rm often allows
inventories to fall to a level below 5 days worth of sales. Moreover, for product 13, the rm
was completely stocked-out (i.e. had zero inventories) for 24 days during the time period.
6. There is considerable high-frequency variation in the sales price, with large changes in sales
prices on successive sale dates. This rm is clearly charging some customers higher prices
than others, a fact readily acknowledged by company executives. While we do not attempt
to model the rm's pricing decisions in this paper, this feature of the data motivates our
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desire to do future work analyzing dynamic models of endogenous price setting and price
discrimination. See Athreya (1999) for an exploratory empirical analysis of the determinants
of price variation among dierent customers, products, and time periods.
We now consider whether any of the standard models of inventories outlined in section 2 are
capable of explaining the six main facts listed above.
1. (S; s) models. The saw-tooth pattern of the inventory series is clearly reminiscent of an
(S; s) policy, which also predicts intervals of steady declining inventories (due to sales to
customers) interspersed by occasional upward jumps in inventories (due to new orders by
the rm). While the saw-tooth pattern of inventory holdings in gure 1 is suggestive of an
(S; s) policy, closer analysis reveals that the rm's behavior cannot possibly be described
by a standard (S; s) rule where S and s are xed time-invariant constants. Under such a
policy the rm places an order of size S   s when its current inventory q falls below the
lower order threshold s. This implies that whenever the rm places an order we should see
inventories replenished to the same target level S. However it is clear from gure 1 that
the amount of inventory the rm holds after each order varies widely over time. Also, in
the absence of large discontinuous downward jumps in inventories resulting from large sales
(e.g. in limiting continuous-time versions of the (S; s) inventory model where sales follow
a diusion process), all orders should be of the same size S   s. It is clear from gure 1
that the size of the rm's orders vary widely over time. Finally, the frequent number of
stockouts also casts doubt on the empirical validity of the continuous time diusion version
of the (S; s) rule, which predicts that in the absence of jumps in the demand process that
with probability 1 inventories will remain in the interval (s; S). When there are positive
xed costs of ordering, s > 0, and the only way inventories can fall below this level is if there
are discontinuous jumps in demand. On the other hand, if xed costs of ordering inventories
were 0, then the rm should place new orders each day to maintain the target inventory
level S. In either case stockouts should not occur under the standard (S; s) model. Thus,
we conclude that this rm's behavior is inconsistent with the predictions of the standard
(S; s) inventory model.
2. Production smoothing models. Our nding that orders are on average 9 times more
variable than sales shows that this rm's behavior is inconsistent with the predictions of
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standard production-smoothing models. These models imply that the variance of production
should be lower than the variance of sales. Of course, one can question the relevance of the
production smoothing model for studying the behavior of this rm since it does a minimal
amount of actual production processing. Although this rm does have a small assembly line
that \levels" steel coil (i.e. it unwinds the coil and chops it into rectangular sheets), the
rm's main \production" activity for many of its other products such as heavy steel plate
and pipe simply involves placing new orders to replace inventory at a time-varying \marginal
cost" pt, the spot price of steel on day t. There are no costs of stopping, idling, and restarting
the \assembly line" for these latter products, so that the theory predicts that there is far less
incentive to attempt to smooth production (which in this case simply amounts to placing
new orders for steel).4 Indeed, to the extent that there are xed costs to placing orders, it
would appear that it is optimal for the rm to do the opposite of production-smoothing,
namely to make relatively infrequent large orders rather than frequent small orders. We
conclude that the standard versions of the production-smoothing model cannot provide a
plausible empirical model for this rm.
3. LQ models. A particularly popular type of production smoothing model is the LQ model,
which is the standard framework for modeling inventories in the macro literature. Unfor-
tunately our analysis suggests that the LQ model has severe deciencies at the micro level,
particularly for describing the product-level inventory holdings of this rm. The LQ model
ignores the frequently binding constraint that orders must be non-negative and is therefore
unable to explain the observation that on most days orders are zero. Even if we were to
interpret the LQ model's predictions of negative orders as representing \desired orders" and
use Tobit-style censoring to map negative desired orders to the observed order of zero, we
believe that the linear laws of motion for the state variables in LQ models would have a hard
time approximating the mass point at zero that we observe in the distributions of quantity
ordered and sold.
4. LQ models with inventory/sales ratio targets. In order to explain the widely observed
fact that production is more volatile than sales, the standard LQ production smoothing mod-
4However Abel (1983) nds in a model with a production lag, stock-outs, and endogenous pricing the variance
of sales exceeds the variance of production even if the cost of producing are linear.
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els have been augmented to include a target inventory/sales ratio and a quadratic penalty
for deviating from this target (e.g. Blanchard, 1983). Although the assumption that the
rm has a xed target inventory/sales ratio is not derived from rst principles, under cer-
tain circumstances tacking on such a term to the rm's cost function yields optimal policies
for which production is more variable than sales. However our data provide little support
for the hypothesis that the rm has a xed inventory/sales target. A simple inspection of
gure 2 shows that the inventory/sales ratio is extremely variable, beginning with a \low
inventory regime" during which the rm has only a month's supply on hand, followed by a
\high inventory regime" when it has more than 5 month's supply on hand. While some of
the rise in the days-supply series is due to a drop in sales during the last two months of the
sample period, much of this dramatic increase appears to be due to signicant declines in
the spot price of steel over the entire period. In simple terms, this rm appears to be engag-
ing in commodity price speculation, attempting to \buy low and sell high". This strategy
implies that the rm should buy large quantities of steel when prices are low, holding it for
subsequent resale when prices are higher. Such a strategy is inconsistent with maintaining
a xed inventory/sales ratio.
Our discussions with company executives lead us to conclude that maintaining a stable
inventory-to-sales ratio is a rather low priority for the rm. When we asked the general
manager whether the rm targeted an inventory-to-sales ratio, he stated that he prefers
to carry under 60 days-supply worth of inventory. When we asked him why then he kept
making large purchases of steel even when his days-supply exceeded 100 days, he stated
that explicit adherence to this rule of thumb would keep him from exploiting good buying
opportunities. Perhaps more importantly the only times the general manager or the CEO
of the rm discussed inventory-to-sales ratios with us was when we brought it up. It is not a
statistic they compute on a regular basis or have in front of them when making purchasing
decisions.
Our analysis of the rm's product level data suggests that cost shocks | which in this case
are mainly changes in the spot price at which the rm acquires steel inventories | could be the
key explanation for the observation that orders are more volatile than sales. A second explanation
is the fact that this rm does not do any actual production processing for the products we have
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studied, and a third explanation is the existence of positive xed costs associated with placing new
orders for steel. We believe the rst explanation is the key to understanding the large variation in
inventory holdings over our sample period. As we can appreciate from gure 3 the spot price of
steel is likely to be one of the most volatile of the cost shocks facing this rm, whereas the other
production and storage costs are unlikely to have varied much over this period. Conversations
with company executives do not give us any reason to believe that the xed costs associated with
ordering steel are large, and no reason to suppose that they should have changed over our sample
period. Similarly, storage costs appear to have been nearly constant over our sample period.
The labor and depreciation costs associated with operating the warehouses in which the steel
inventories are stored are small in comparison to the main cost of storage, the opportunity cost
of capital as measured by the short term interest rate. The interest rate has been fairly constant
over our sample period, and there haven't been any changes in the physical production/storage
technology that we are aware of. On the other hand the rm's major \cost of production", the
spot price of steel, has declined fairly dramatically for many of its products including carbon plate
products as we have seen in gure 3. Many of these price declines are a consequence of reduced
world-wide steel demand following the Asian crisis together with possible \dumping" of steel by
foreign producers in Russia, Japan, Brazil, and other countries.
More sophisticated econometric and economic modeling is required in order to assess the
relative importance of the dierent explanations of the observation that orders are more volatile
than sales. A major problem is created by the fact that we only observe spot prices for the
rm's products on the days it placed orders, resulting in infrequent observations of spot prices at
irregular time intervals. Due to econometric problems arising from endogenous sampling of these
spot price processes, we have been careful not to draw any conclusions about the high frequency
behavior of steel prices by simply interpolating our endogenously sampled spot price series. In
future work we will develop estimators that correct for this endogenous sampling problem, but
in the meantime we have focused our analysis on characterizing the main facts about inventory
stocks, orders, and sales for which problems of endogenous sampling problems do not arise. Our
analysis has lead us to reject all of the main models that have been used to model inventory
behavior in the existing literature.
In the next section we formulate and solve a dynamic programming model of inventory in-
vestment by durable commodity intermediaries, in which the optimal policy is a generalization of
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the classic (S; s) rule with (S; s) bands that are declining functions of the current spot price of
steel. This suggests that many of the stylized facts we have observed for this rm, particularly
the observation that orders are more variable than sales and the instability in inventory/sales
ratios, could be a consequence of an optimal inventory speculation strategy on the part of the
rm. We conrm this in section 5 by presenting simulations of a calibrated version of this model
that show that the predicted behavior of this model is strikingly similar to the behavior of this
rm. In particular simulated data from the model exhibits 5 of the 6 main features that we have
observed in the product level data for this rm.
4 The Model
Our model is in the tradition of the dynamic (S; s) model pioneered by Arrow et. al. (1951) and
Scarf (1959). We extend their models to allow the spot market price at which the rm purchases
the commodity to follow a Markov process. The uncertainty and serial correlation in spot prices
imply that a simple (S; s) strategy with xed S and s thresholds is generally no longer optimal.
The optimal inventory investment strategy in our extended model is a function of the spot market
price for the commodity p as well as inventory on hand q. However we nd that a generalized
(S; s) rule is optimal. The rm's optimal trading strategy consists of a pair of functions S(p)
and s(p) satisfying s(p)  S(p). The lower band s(p) is the rm's order threshold, i.e. it is
optimal for the rm to order inventory whenever q  s(p). The upper band S(p) is the rm's
target inventory level, i.e. whenever the rm places an order to replenish its inventory, it orders
an amount suÆcient to insure that inventory on hand (the sum of the current inventory plus new
orders) equals S(p).
Furthermore, the (S; s) bands are generally monotonically declining functions of p, reecting
the simple logic of commodity price speculation, namely to \buy low and sell high". Low spot
prices present an opportunity for the intermediary to make an expected prot by purchasing the
commodity when it is cheap, storing it, and subsequently selling it at a higher price. While we
assume that the rm could sell the commodity immediately with a positive expected mark-up over
the current spot price, most of its prots are obtained from selling the commodity in subsequent
periods when the gross of markup prices at which the intermediary sells to its customers have
\recovered". It follows that the rm's desired holdings of the commodity are larger when spot
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prices are low than when spot prices are high.
Under certain circumstances the generalized (S; s) rule takes the form of a \bang-bang" strat-
egy with price \thresholds": whenever the spot price falls below a price threshold the rm makes a
speculative \bet" by placing large orders for steel. This results in large, infrequent discontinuous
increases in inventory levels during periods of unusually low \bargain prices" in the spot market,
behavior. This behavior is consistent with the observed instabilities and \regime shifts" in the
inventory/sales ratio that we observed in our steel intermediary data. It is suboptimal for the
intermediary to set a xed, time-invariant inventory/sales target as is typically assumed in LQ
models since this impedes the rm's ability to prot from buying low and selling high. Indeed
when spot prices are suÆciently high the rm's desired inventory holdings can fall to nearly zero
and the incidence of stockouts rises precipitously. The high sales revenues and high opportunity
costs of inventory holding during high price \regimes" make it optimal for the rm to liquidate
rather than replenish its inventory holdings. Once fully liquidated, the rm optimally chooses to
forego inventory investment until spot prices revert to lower levels, even though this comes at a
high cost in terms of sacriced sales revenue and a steep increase in the incidence of stockouts.
We derive these results from a relatively simple dynamic programming model of a generic
durable commodity intermediary. These intermediaries do not not undertake any physical pro-
duction processing: their main function is to buy the durable good at spot prices, store it, and
sell it subsequently at a markup. We make a number of strong simplifying assumptions about the
operations of these intermediaries that we hope to relax in future work. Our rst simplication is
a decentralization hypothesis that allows us to model the inventory investment decisions for each
product traded by the intermediary separately. This separation is formally justied under the as-
sumption that there are no technological interdependencies (storage externalities or joint capacity
constraints) for the dierent products the intermediary carries, and the strong assumption that
the price processes for the dierent products are conditionally independent. Under these assump-
tions it is easy to show that the rm's multi-product inventory investment problem decomposes
into independent subproblems: essentially each individual product becomes a separate sub-rm
or \prot center" which can be modeled in isolation from the others.
We need this assumption to break the \curse of dimensionality" associated with the rm's
dynamic programming problem. In the absence of decentralization, a \central planner" within the
rm would have to solve a single 4400+ dimensional dynamic programming problem (since each of
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the rm's 2200+ products requires a minimum of two continuous state variables, p and q). Since
the complexity of continuous-state and continuous-control DP problems increases exponentially
fast in the number of state and control variables, it is clear that such a problem would is far
too large to solve using current hardware and software. However under our decentralization
hypothesis, the rm's problem decomposes into 2200+ lower dimensional DP problems, each of
which is tractable. Thus the decentralization hypothesis makes it feasible for us to model the
entire rm by simply summing the optimal trading rules for each individual product. There are
interesting questions about how this rm decentralizes its operations in practice (many of the
sales and pricing decisions for individual products are delegated to the rm's sales agents), but
we do not have space here to oer more in depth consideration of these issues.
We abstract from diÆcult issues connected with modeling endogenous price setting and price
discrimination and assume that the rm charges a xed markup over the current spot price of
the commodity. We also abstract from taxes and the details of the rm's nancial policy: these
issues will be discussed in more detail below. Finally, we abstract from delivery lags and assume
that the rm cannot backlog unlled orders. Thus, whenever demand exceeds quantity on hand,
the residual unlled demand is lost. This fundamental \opportunity cost" motivates the rm to
incur inventory holding costs, even in the absence of any stockout penalty capturing the \goodwill
costs" of lost future sales due to alienated customers.
We model the intermediary as making decisions about buying and selling a durable commodity
in discrete time. For concreteness, we consider a model with daily time intervals, matching the
intervals in our data set. The state variables for the rm are (pt; qt) where qt denotes the inventory
on hand at the start of day t, and pt denotes the per unit spot price at which the intermediary
can purchase the commodity at day t. We assume fptg evolves according to an exogenous Markov
process with transition density g(pt+1jpt). At the start of day t the intermediary observes (pt; qt)
and places an order qot  0 for immediate delivery of the commodity at the current spot price pt.
We assume that the intermediary sets a uniform sales price to its customers, pst , via an exogenously
specied markup rule over the current spot price pt:
pst = f(pt) + t; Eftjptg = 0: (2)
As a rst approximation, we assume the rm uses a linear markup rule, f(pt) = 0+1pt, where
0 and 1 are positive constants.
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After receiving qot and setting p
s
t , the intermediary observes the quantity demanded, q
d
t . We
assume that the distribution of qdt depends on the spot price pt, reecting a stochastic form of
downward sloping demand. Let H(qdt jpt) denote the distribution of realized customer demand. We
assume that H has support on [0;1) with at most one mass point at qd = 0 and is regular in the
sense that for any continuous, bounded function G, the function EG(p; q) is a twice continuously
dierentiable function of its arguments where EG is given by:
EG(p; q) =
Z
G(p; q; qd)H(dqdjp): (3)
We allow H to have a mass point at 0, reecting the event that the intermediary receives no
customer orders on a given day t. Let h(qdjp) be the conditional density of sales given that qd > 0.
This is a density with support on the interval (0;1). Let (p) = H(0jp) be the probability that
qd = 0. Then we can write H as follows:




As noted above, we assume that there are no delivery lags and unlled orders are not back-
logged. This eliminates the need to carry additional state variables describing the status of pending
deliveries and backlogged orders. We also assume that the rm does not behave strategically with
regard to its sales to its customers. In addition to charging an exogenously specied markup as
in equation (2), the rm does not withhold any inventory for future sale when there is a current
demand for it. Thus, we assume that the intermediary meets the entire demand for its product
in day t subject to the constraint that it can not sell more that the quantity it has on hand, the
sum of beginning period inventory qt and new orders q
o
t , qt+ q
o
t . Thus the intermediary's realized










We assume the commodity is completely durable and not subject to physical depreciation. There-
fore the law of motion for start of period inventory holdings fqtg is given by:
qt+1 = qt + q
o
t   qst : (6)
Since the quantity demanded has support on the [0;1) interval, equation (5) implies that there is
always a positive probability of unlled demand qst < q
d
t . We let Æ(p; q+q
o) denote the probability
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of this event:
Æ(p; q + qo) = 1 H(q + qojp): (7)
Whenever qdt > q
s
t , equations (5) and (6) imply that a stockout occurs, i.e. qt+1 = 0. Of course,
the rm can minimize the probability of a stockout by insuring that quantity on hand, q + qo,
is suÆciently high. It is interesting to ask whether it would ever be optimal for the rm to set
q + qo = 0, which maximizes the probability of a stockout. This can be optimal in our model if
spot prices and holding costs are suÆciently high.
We dene the intermediary's expected sales revenue ES(p; q; qo) by:
ES(p; q; qo) = Efpsqsjp; q; qog
= EfpsjpgEfqsjp; q; qog (8)
where:
Efpsjpg = f(p) (9)
and:
Efqsjp; q; qog = [1  (p)]
"Z q+qo
o
qdh(qdjp)dqd + Æ(p; q + qo)[q + qo]
#
: (10)
A key property to notice about the ES function is that it is symmetric in its q and qo arguments:
from the denitions given above we see that ES can be written as ES(p; q+ qo). Thus, expected
sales revenue depends only on the total quantity on hand q + qo, rather than upon the separate
values of q and qo. This symmetry is a key to the proof of the optimality of the generalized (S; s)
policy.
We turn now to specifying the per period prot function, which requires some additional
assumptions about taxes and the intermediary's nancial policy. We appeal to the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem to argue that in the absence of taxes, borrowing constraints, and other capital
market imperfections, the intermediary's inventory investment policy should be unaected by its
nancial policy. This allows us to abstract from the details of how the intermediary actually
nances its inventory holdings and allows us to conclude that regardless of whether its inventory
holdings are nanced by debt or retained earnings, the intermediary incurs an interest opportunity
cost of inventory holdings equal to rtpt(qt + q
o
t ) in day t where rt denotes the spot interest rate
at date t. However we model the intermediary as an entrepreneur whose personal intertemporal
discount factor is  2 (0; 1) which may not equal the current market discount factor 1=(1 + rt).
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This implies that the owner would like to borrow when  is less than 1=(1+rt) and lend otherwise.
Thus, nancial policy does aect the rm's expected discounted prots even in the absence of
taxes, borrowing constraints, and other capital market imperfections. Since the steel company
will not disclose information about their nancial policy, we assume the intermediary nances its
inventory holdings out of retained earnings, incurring an opportunity cost of maintaining inventory
level qt equal to rtptqt. Furthermore, we assume rt is xed; rt = r for all t.
5
We assume the intermediary incurs a cost of ordering inventory given by a function co(qo)
which may be discontinuous at qo = 0 but is twice continuously dierentiable for qo > 0. The
discontinuity in co at qo = 0 reects possible xed costs of placing orders. For concreteness, we
will assume a simple xed order cost,
co(qo) =
(
F if qo > 0
0 otherwise
(11)
This specication could be easily generalized to account for per unit shipping costs and quantity
discounts. However in order to derive the optimality of a generalized (S; s) policy we need to
assume that the derivative of co is constant for qo > 0. For simplicity we assume this derivative
is 0 in what follows below.
We assume that the intermediary incurs a physical storage cost ch(q) of holding inventory level
q, where ch is nondecreasing and twice continuously dierentiable. The intermediary perceives a
\goodwill cost"   0, where  represents the present value of lost prots from customers who
switch to alternative suppliers in the event that qd > q + qo. Finally the intermediary has a






t ; qt; q
o




t   rpt(qt + qot )  co(qot )  ch(qt + q0t )  ptqot   Ifqst = qt + qot g: (12)
Notice that our assumptions imply that the prot function  is symmetrical in its qt and q
o
t




t ; qt + q
o
t ).
The intermediary's inventory investment behavior is governed by the decision rule:
qot = q
o(pt; qt); (13)
5The assumption of constant interest rates can be easily relaxed as far as the theoretical presentation of the
model is concerned, however it does lead to an extra state variable that complicates the numerical solution of the
model. In future work we plan to include rt as a state variable to study the sensitivity of inventories to changes in
interest rates, a topic of interest in studies of the role of inventories in macroeconomic uctuations.
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where the function qo is the solution to:



















The value function V (p; q) is given by the unique solution to Bellman's equation:
V (p; q) = max
0qoq q
h




W (p; q) 
h
ES(p; q)  rpq   ch(q)  Æ(p; q + qo) + EV (p; q)
i
: (16)
and EV denotes the conditional expectation of V given by:













V (p0; q   q0)h(q0jp)g(p0jp)dq0dp0: (17)
The optimal decision rule qo(p; q) is given by:
qo(p; q) = argmax
0qoq q
h
W (p; q + qo)  pqo   co(qo)
i
; (18)
Hall and Rust (1999) proved the following theorem, which includes Scarf's (1960) characteri-
zation of the optimality of (S; s) as a special case. The key to the proof is the same as in Scarf's
(1960) theorem, the property of K-concavity.
Denition: A function f : R+ ! R is K-concave if and only if for all q 2 R+ and all z  0 and
all b  0 satisfying q   b  0 we have:
f(q + z) K  f(q) + z
b
[f(q)  f(q   b)] : (19)
Intuitively, a (nonconcave) function is K-concave if the secant approximation to f(q+z) given
on the right hand side of equation (19) exceeds f(q + z) less the constant K. Clearly a concave
function is 0-concave, and thus K-concave for all K  0. Hall and Rust (1999) prove that if
W (p; q + qo)   pqo is K-concave in qo, then the optimal inventory policy is an (S; s) rule. So it
suÆces to establish suÆcient conditions forW (p; q+qo) pqo to be K-concave. There are two key
lemmas that are used to establish this result: 1) the Bellman operator maps K-concave functions
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into K-concave functions, and 2) pointwise limits of K-concave functions are K-concave. For
details of the proof of the following Theorem, see Hall and Rust (1999).
Theorem: Consider the function W (p; q + qo) dened in equation (16), where W is dened in
terms of the unique solution V to Bellman's equation (15). If W (p; q+qo) is a K-concave function
of qo for any p, then the rm's optimal inventory investment policy qo(p; q) takes the form of a
generalized (S; s) rule. That is, there exist a pair of functions (S; s) satisfying S(p)  s(p) where
S(p) is the desired or target inventory level and s(p) is the inventory order threshold, i.e.
qo(p; q) =
(
0 if q  s(p)
S(p)  q otherwise (20)
where S(p) is given by:
S(p) = argmax0qoq q
h
W (p; qo)  pqo
i
(21)
and the lower inventory order limit, s(p) is the value of q that makes the rm indierent between
ordering and not ordering more inventory:
s(p) = inf
q0
fqjW (p; q)  pq W (p; S(p))  pS(p)  Fg : (22)
We conclude this section by noting that if the decision rule take the form of a generalized
(S; s) policy, the value function is linear in q with slope equal to p when q < s(p). To see this, we
simply substitute the form of the generalized (S; s) policy (20) into the formula for V in Bellman's
equation (15) to obtain:
V (p; q) =
(
W (p; S(p))  p[S(p)  q]  F if q  s(p)
W (p; q) otherwise
(23)
Thus, V takes the form V (p; q) = (p)+pq for q  s(p), which shows that the \shadow price" of an
extra unit of inventory is p. The intuition for this simple result is straightforward: if the rm has
an extra unit of q when q  s(p) then it needs to order one fewer unit in order to attain its target
inventory level S(p). The savings from ordering one fewer unit of inventory is simply the current
spot price of the commodity, p. When q > s(p) the shadow price of inventory is no longer equal to
p. We do know that since q = S(p) maximizes W (p; q)  pq, we must have @W (p; q)=@q = p when
q = S(p). IfW were strictly concave, @W (p; q)=@q > p when q 2 (s(p); S(p)] and @W (p; q)=@q < p
when q 2 (S(p); q]. Thus, there is a kink in V function at the inventory order threshold, q = s(p).
which is inconsistent with the assumption that W is strictly concave in q. However the result
does hold under the weaker condition that W is K-concave in q.
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5 A Calibrated Example
To illustrate the behavior implied by our model we solved a discrete approximation of (15) numer-
ically under the following assumptions. We assumed that the daily interest rate is time-invariant
and equal to r = :05=261.6 We assumed the rm uses the sales price markup rule pst = 0:9+1:06pt
and spot prices fptg evolve according to a truncated lognormal AR(1) process:
log(pt+1) = p + p log(pt) + t (24)
where p = :06, p = :98, and ftg is an IID N(0; 2p) sequence, with 2p = 8:6510 5. The upper
and lower truncation bounds on this process were chosen to be (16; 25) which are beyond the
minimum and maximum spot purchase prices observed in our sample or in long run simulations
of the untruncated version of this process.
We choose the function form and parameters values for the price process to qualatativiely
match the histograms of the transaction prices generated by simulations from our model with the
histograms of the transaction prices observed in the data. Recall that we only observe prices on
days the rm purchases steel so we have infrequently and irregularly sampled price series in which
the sampling is made by the rm endogenously. Since estimators that correct for this endogenous
sampling problem do not exist, we t the price process visually rather than employing a formal
econometric criterion. The current parameterization of equation (24) yields an order price process
with an invariant distribution with mean of 20:5 cents per pound and a standard deviation of
1:00 cents per pound. Given the markup rule, the mean and standard deviation of the sell price
process are 22:6 and 1:06, respectively. The means of these price processes are in the range of
means reported in table 1. The standard deviations are below those reported in table 1; but
again, we are silent on the issue of price discrimination.
We assumed that quantity demanded, qdt , is a mixed truncated lognormal distribution con-
ditional on pt. That is, with probability :5 q
d
t = 0, and with probability :5 q
d
t is a draw from a
truncated lognormal distribution with location parameter q(p) = 4:43   :7 log(pt) and standard
deviation parameter q = 1:081.
7 These parameters yield a stationary distribution for qdt (condi-
tional on qdt > 0) with conditional mean equal to 18:3 and conditional standard deviation equal
6We assumed there are 365   (2 52) business days in a year.





increases and qt decreases. So markups are procyclical. We have experimented with various forms of the markup
rule and have found that the basic results of the model do not depend on procyclical markups.
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to 28:2. The units of the quantity variables are in 1,000's of pounds. The rst two moments of
the quantity demanded process are in the range of the moments reported in columns (7) and (9)
in table 2.
We assumed that goodwill costs of stockouts  and physical holding costs were zero, ch(qt) = 0,
and that the xed order cost is equal to $50, i.e. co(0) = 0 and co(qo) = $50 if qo > 0. Finally, we
assumed that the rm owner's personal subjective discount factor was given (on a daily basis) by
 = 1=(1 + :05=261); so  = 1=(1 + r).
We solved for the optimal inventory investment rule by the method of policy function iteration
which computes a discrete approximation to the value function V (p; q) as the unique xed point
to the Bellman equation, (15). We used a uniform discretization of the (p; q) state space to
approximate the continuous DP problem by the solution to a nite state problem with 750 grid
points (15 in the p dimension and 50 in the q dimension). The grid points are evenly spaced
along the p dimension. Along the q dimension, the distance between the grid points increases as q
increases. Thus the grid point are more densely spaced in the region where there is more curvature
in the decision rule. Although the state variables were discretized, we treated the control variable
qo as a continuous variable subject to the constraint that 0  qo  q   q. Policy iteration is
not guaranteed to converge in continuous choice problems such as this one; but for this example,
the algorithm converged in 39 iterations. Using the values computed at these 750 grid points
we produced continuous approximations to the value function and decision rule via multi-linear
interpolation.
As can be seen from Bellman's equation (15), the policy improvement step requires the solution
of a constrained optimization problem involving the two functions ES(p; q) and EV (p; q), each
of which is a conditional expectation of functions of two continuous variables (sales, psqs, and
the value function, V (p; q)). Since no analytic solutions to these conditional expectations exist,
we resorted to numerical integration. We experimented with two dierent methods of numerical
integration, a \quadrature" approach that approximates EV by a probability weighted sum:









Ifqj  qgV̂ (pi; q   qj)h(pj jpi)g(pijp) (25)
where h(qjjpi) is a discretized approximation to the conditional probability density h(qjp; q) and
g(pijp) is a discretized approximation to the transition probability density g(p0jp). Further ad-
justments to this formula were made in order to allow ÊV (p; q) to account for mass points on
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stockouts and zero sales as in equation (17). A second method of approximating EV was a \quasi
monte carlo, probability integral transform method" (MC-PIT) given by





V̂ (~pi; q   ~qi) (26)
where f~pi; ~qig are draws from the density h(q0jp0; q)g(p0jp) computed from uniformly distributed
draws f~u1;i; ~u2;ig from the unit square, [0; 1]2 via the probability integral transform method.
Instead of using pseudo-random random draws for f~u1;i; ~u2;ig we obtained acceleration using
Generalized Faure sequences, also known as Tezuka sequences. Using number-theoretic methods
(see, e.g. Neiderreiter 1992, or Tezuka, 1995), one can prove that for certain classes of integrands,
the convergence of monte carlo methods based on deterministic low discrepancy sequences is
O(log(N)d=N) where d is the dimension of the integrand and N is the number of points. This rate
of convergence dominates the rate of convergence of carlo methods converge at rate Op(1=
p
N).
These favorable rates of convergence have been observed in practice, see e.g. Papageorgiou and
Traub (1997).8 The density h(q0jp; q) is the conditional density of q0 given that q0  q,
h(q0jp; q) = h(q
0jp)
1  Æ(p; q) (27)
where Æ(p; q) = Prfq0 > qjpg = 1 H(qjp). As in the quadrature method, we adjusted the MC-PIT
formula (26) to account for mass points corresponding to stockouts and zero sales. We found that
the optimal order size qo was sensitive to the way the functions ES and EV are approximated.
It was critical to use methods that provide accurate approximations both their levels and their
derivatives, since the latter determine the rst order conditions for a constrained optimum for qo.
In regions where EV (p; q) is nearly linear in q, small inaccuracies in the estimated derivatives can
create oscillations in the approximations to EV causing the approximate solution to have multiple
local maxima. Without very careful safeguarding of the uni-dimensional optimization algorithm
for computing optimal order size, the algorithm could get stuck on a local maximum, generating
large instabilities in the estimated value of qo. The solutions are also sensitive to the discretization
of the p and q axes, and the number of points used in the discretization. Through a fair amount
of experimentation we have developed numerical procedures that we trust. In particular the two
dierent approximation methods for computing ÊS and ÊV discussed above produced nearly
identical results.
8We are grateful to Joseph Traub for providing the FINDER software co-authored with A.F. Papageorgiou that
generated the low discrepancy sequences used in this study.
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Figures 17-20 present the optimal decision rule qo as a function of p and q and the associated
expected sales, value functions, and (S; s) bands. Note that our solution technique does not
exploit our prior knowledge about the form of the decision rule. The computed value function
is nearly a linear function of q. At low inventory levels (in regions the rm is expecting to buy
steel), V (p; q) is decreasing in p, whereas at high values of q, (in regions the rm is expecting to
not buy but just sell steel) V is increasing in p. The kink at s(p) is not apparent at this level of
resolution. These results are consistent with the discussion in the previous section. The optimal
decision rule is decreasing in both p and q, although it generally decreases faster in p than in q.
In particular when qo(p; q) > 0, @qo(p; q)=@q =  1 which is consistent with the prediction of the
generalized (S; s) rule that qo(p; q) = S(p)  q.
Figure 19 shows the generalized (S(p); s(p)) bands implied by our model. The graph of the
function s is the curve on the (q; p) plane where the qo(p; q) surface intersects the plane at qo = 0.
The graph of S, is the curve on the (qo; p) plane where the q
o(q; p) surface intersects the plane
at q = 0. These bands are plotted in gure 20 to make it easier to compare them. Due to the
xed costs of ordering ($50), the S(p) band is strictly above the s(p) band although the dierence
between the two bands decreases as the price increases. In other words, the order size at s is a
decreasing function of the price.
As can be seen in gure 20, when the price is near the lower truncation price bound (16 cents
per pound), the constraint on maximum storage capacity q (5 million pounds) becomes binding.9
This makes sense because the rm knows prices cannot go any lower. The rm cannot make a
capital loss on any steel purchased at the lower bound. Nevertheless, this boundary issue is not
a major concern since the rm very rarely ever observes prices in this region; this region is over
4 standard deviations away from the mean of the price process.
Figures 21- 24 present the results from a single stochastic simulation of the DP model for 434
periods. At rst glance, the simulated series look quite similar to the actual data. Figure 21 shows
the time series for inventory levels, and there appears to be multiple regimes. During the rst 275
days of the simulation, inventory levels are centered around 200,000 pounds. This average level
matches the average level of inventory holdings for product 13 and the rst 200 days of product 4.
Starting around day 275, the rm enters a \high inventory regime" with the simulated inventory
levels reaching a peak over 1,500,000 pounds. This peak is consistent with observed levels of
9In gure 19 we plot the decision rule for prices between 17 and 24 to make the graph more easily readable.
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inventories for products 2 and 4. During this high inventory regime, days supply reaches almost
350. The transition from the low to high inventory regime occurs when the order price falls below
a threshold value. Later, as prices begin to rise (from day 360 to the end of the simulation) the
rm lets its inventory holdings gradually fall.
The high- and low-regime property of the optimal inventory holdings can be seen from the
decision rule, qo(q; p). In gure 19, qo(q; p) is sharply decreasing in p when qo(q; p) > 0. This
occurs for two reasons. First, the rm takes advantage of low order prices to build up inventories
knowing that it is likely to capture a capital gain on its inventory holdings when prices rise.
Second, the rm faces a downward sloping demand curve for its product; so when the price falls,
qd rises and the rm will hold more inventories to accommodate the increase in demand.
The simulation results are consistent with this intuition. Figure 23 presents the censored and
uncensored order and sales price series. In this graph, the solid line is the \censored transaction
price process" analogous to the one we observe in our dataset. For convenience, we superimposed a
linear interpolation of the times and prices at which simulated orders took place on the underlying
uncensored \latent price process" fptg which is plotted as a dotted line in gure 23. Under an
optimal ordering strategy, the rm appears to have an uncanny ability to predict turning points
in spot prices, with most orders occurring at local minimum points of the realized trajectory for
fptg. When prices hit a record low around days 285 and 360, the rm placed several very large
orders that ushered it into a \high inventory regime" between days 260 and 434.
In this simulation the rm sold steel on 210 days at average price of 22.67 during the simulation
period and purchased steel on 26 days at an average price of 20:04. The average order size was
116; 000 pounds with a conditional standard deviation of 62:3. These implied moments from the
model are consistent with the moments we observe in the data. Finally the ratio of the standard
deviation of orders to the standard deviation of sales for this simulation is 2.4. So the model does
imply that orders are more volatile than sales. The particular realization we presented is typical,
and not designed to make our model look good. Longer simulations also generate similar results.
These results are qualitatively similar to the actual inventory time series for our rm in g-
ures 5-16. Our DP model display regime shifts in the inventory levels and days supply of inventory
with little evidence of a single xed inventory/sales target; however, we have not systematically
searched over the parameter space to ensure that our DP model captures the full volatility and
magnitude in these regime shifts. In our individual product data, we also see very large increases
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inventory levels occurring when prices hit what appear to be record lows. But we do not see the
either very large or very small individual orders. In particular the large increase in inventories
around day 350 is spread across four orders. Moreover comparing gures 6, 10, and 14 with
gure 22, we see that the DP model generates fewer small size orders than we observe in the data.
This suggests that perhaps the xed order cost is too large; however when we set the xed cost to
zero, we get the counterfactual result that with prices are high, the rm tightly matches orders to
sales, ordering almost every period an amount equal to last period's sales. Finally the model does
imply occasional stockouts. In the simulation, the rm stocked out on day 108 when quantity
demanded was unusually large (over 1 million pounds) and current inventories were relatively low
(around 250,000 pounds).
We conclude that cost shocks in the form of serially correlated spot prices in the steel market
is the principal explanation for the observed volatility in inventory/sales ratios and the fact that
orders are more volatile than sales. We believe this simple model provides a promising starting
point for more rigorous estimation and testing using more advanced econometric methods.
6 Aggregation
It is natural to ask whether the rm we study is representative of other durable commodity
intermediaries. We address this issue in gure 3 which presents a monthly price index for carbon
plate constructed by Purchasing Magazine. The data are from January, 1987 to February, 1999.
We deated this index by the PPI-all commodities so the units are in 1982 cents per pound.10
Note that at the end of the sample the real price of carbon plate is at (at least) a twelve-year low.
Figure 4 plots the rm's days-supply for product 2, a specic type of carbon plate. We also plot
the aggregate days-supply of carbon plate for member rms of the Steel Service Center Institute
(SSCI).11 Finally we plot the days supply for establishments in the SIC 505 sector (wholesale
trade: metal and minerals, except petroleum). All three data series are monthly, and we plot
three-month centered-moving averages. Since the mean of the SIC 505 data is one half the mean
of SSCI and individual rm data, the scale for the SSCI and rm-level data is the left-hand side
axis, and the scale for the SIC 505 data is one the right-hand side axis.
10Deating this price index by the CPI would not change any of analysis presented below.
11The SSCI is an industry organization which among other things collects data on member rms' shipments and
inventory holdings.
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For the sample period of our rm-level dataset (July, 1997 to February, 1999) the more ag-
gregated data appear to be consistent with both our rm level data and the implications of our
theory. During this period carbon plate prices fell to record lows and inventory levels at all three
levels of aggregation rose signicantly. This suggests that the rm's strategy of placing speculative
bets is not atypical of metal wholesalers. We would observe similar results if we were to aggre-
gate the simulated inventory holdings of dierent simulated rms. While there are idiosyncratic
demand shocks that will be averaged out over rms in the simulation, their behavior is aected in
a similar way by the common \cost shock" fptg. To the extent that these price series are aected
by macroeconomic factors such as the Asian crisis, we have a simple explanation for the role of
inventory investment as a propagating mechanism in the business cycle. It would not be diÆcult
to add other \macro shocks" to our model. For example, rather than allowing the interest to be
constant, we could allow frtg to evolve stochastically, say according to a Markov process. We
would then be able to study the impact of monetary policy on inventory investment, determining
features such as the interest elasticity of inventory investment. This is a topic for future work,
however.
We note that the aggregate data present several interesting challenges to try to explain using
the model developed in this paper. For example the large swings observed in price of carbon plate
seem supercially at odds with the predictions of our model and the commodity storage literature
more generally. In particular the latter literature implies that the price process should satisfy the











The rst terms @ES(p; S(p))=@q   rp   @ch(S(p))=@q constitute the \convenience yield" net of
holding costs of adding an extra unit of inventory, the analog of the term c(xt) in the commodity
storage model in equation (1). In our case, the convenience yield equals the increase in expected
sales of having an extra unit of inventory and the holding costs are the sum of the interest
opportunity costs rp plus the marginal physical holding costs @ch(S(p))=@q. The second term,
@EV (p; S(p))=@q, is the expected discounted shadow price of an extra unit of inventory. However
as we noted above, V is essentially linear in q with slope p, so @EV (p; S(p))=@q is the analog of
the term Efpt+1jpt; xt; ztg in equation (1). Large swings in prices in and of themselves do not
contradict either (1) or (28), but intermediaries such as the one we study should tend to dampen
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price swings by buying when prices are low and selling o accumulated inventory when prices are
high.
It is striking to note that even with 5,000 steel service centers in the U.S., each one presumably
solving a dynamic programming problem similar to one presented above, the real price of carbon
plate rose 70 percent from early-1987 to mid-1988 only to fall 50 percent by mid-1992. A very
puzzling feature is that during the 1988-1989 period prices for carbon steel hit a record high {
but so did days-supply both at the steel service center industry level and at the three digit SIC
level. According to our model, if intermediaries viewed the prices during this period as being in
a temporary \high price regime", they should have been reducing rather than increasing their
inventory holdings. Furthermore during the early 1990s as price fell, so did days supply, a result
that is also hard to explain using our model. Of course there may have been demand shocks in
the steel market during this period that we are currently unaware of and that might need to be
incorporated in a more realistic model. We hope to address these issues more fully in future work.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a new data set containing high quality, high frequency observations
on product-level inventory investment by a U.S. steel wholesaler. Our empirical analysis yielded
six conclusions about inventory investment and price setting by this rm: 1) orders are more
volatile than sales, 2) orders are made infrequently, 3) there is considerable volatility in order
levels, 4) there is no stable inventory/sale relationship, 5) there is considerable volatility in sales
prices consistent with price discrimination, and 6) inventory stockouts occur relatively frequently,
especially during periods of high commodity prices when inventory holdings are low.
We argued that the standard versions of the (S; s) model, production smoothing models, and
LQ models with target inventory/sales ratios are incapable of explaining these facts. We intro-
duced a new model of optimal inventory speculation by durable commodity intermediaries and
showed that the optimal inventory investment strategy takes the form of a generalized (S; s) rule
where the S and s bands are declining functions of the spot price of the commodity. Simulations
of a calibrated version of our DP model suggest that the rm's behavior at the product level can
be well approximated by an optimal trading strategy. We employed a continuous-state version of
Howard's policy iteration algorithm to solve a two-dimensional nonlinear innite horizon dynamic
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programming problem with continuous state and control variables that are subject to frequently
binding inequality constraints. The predicted behavior from the generalized (S; s) rule appears
to explain a number of dierent aspects of inventory investment behavior by our steel wholesaler,
including highly variable inventory/sales ratios and occasional stockouts during low inventory
regimes when the spot price for steel is relatively high.
In future work we plan to undertake more rigorous econometric estimation and testing of our
generalized (S; s) model which will account for diÆcult problems of \dynamic selectivity bias"
arising from endogenous sampling of the prices at which the rm purchases inventory. We also
plan to extend the model to allow for additional state and control variables such as the rm's sales
price pt and the interest rate rt. The former will allow us to study endogenous price determination
and price discrimination, whereas the latter will allow us to study the impact of monetary policy
on inventory investment as a potential propagating mechanism for business cycles. In doing so,
we will need to address some diÆcult issues connected with the curse of dimensionality underlying
the solution of high dimensional DP problems such as the one considered in our paper. Recent
progress in this area by Rust (1997, 1998) and Rust, Traub, and Wozniakowski (1998) make us
optimistic about the prospect for solving these larger and more realistic models.
In future work we plan to develop more realistic models that relax the some of the strong
simplifying assumptions in our model. This includes our assumption that the current spot price
pt is a suÆcient statistic for the distribution of per period retail demand. We want to allow for
the impact of \macro demand shocks" and the possibility that the rm's demand in period t, qdt
also depends on its realized value in previous periods. More ambitiously, we would like to model
equilibrium determination of prices in durable commodities markets with three dierent types of
agents: producers, retail consumers, and intermediaries. We want determine whether the funda-
mental functional equation in the rational expectations commodity price model of Williams and
Wright, equation (1), can be derived from microfoundations in a market where informational fric-
tions and transactions costs lead to considerable price dispersion and potential market ineÆciency
despite the standard nature of the product.
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Figure 1: Aggregate inventory holdings for the eighteen products studied.




















Figure 2: Aggregate days-supply for the eighteen products studied (in business days).
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Figure 3: Price index of carbon plate steel from Purchasing Magazine deated by the PPI.
































Days Supply for Three Levels of Aggregation



























Figure 4: Three-month moving average of days-supply for product 2 (dashed line), days-supply
for aggregate carbon plate of SSCI rms (solid line), and days-supply for all rms in the SIC
505 sector (dotted line). The units for the rm's holding of product 2 and the SSCI companies
holdings are on the left-hand side axis; for the SIC 505 sector the units are on the right-hand side
axis.
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Figure 6: Size of purchases for product 2 as
a function current inventory holdings and the
buy price.


























Figure 7: Order prices (solid line) and sell
prices (dashed line) for product 2. For the
order price series, the size of the marker is
proportional to the size of the purchase.


















Figure 8: Days-supply of inventory for prod-
uct 2 (in business days).
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Figure 10: Size of purchases for product 4 as
a function current inventory holdings and the
buy price.


























Figure 11: Order prices (solid line) and sell
prices (dashed line) for product 4. For the
order price series, the size of the marker is
proportional to the size of the purchase.


















Figure 12: Days-supply of inventory for prod-
uct 4 (in business days).
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Figure 14: Size of purchases for product 13 as
a function current inventory holdings and the
buy price.



























Figure 15: Order prices (solid line) and sell
prices (dashed line) for product 13. For the
order price series, the size of the marker is
proportional to the size of the purchase.


















Figure 16: Days-supply of inventory for prod-
uct 13 (in business days).
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Figure 17: Expected sales revenue, ES for
the calibrated example.
Figure 18: The value function, V (q; p) for
the calibrated example.
Figure 19: Decision rule, qo(q; p), for the
calibrated example. Figure 20: S(p) and s(p) for the calibrated
example.
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Figure 22: Simulated orders as a function cur-
rent inventory holdings and buy price.

























Figure 23: Censored (solid line) and Uncen-
sored (dotted line) order and sales prices from
the simulation.

















Figure 24: Simulated days-supply of inventory
(in business days).
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